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FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/
TO RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC/
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC/
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50
USC 3024(i)

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SERIAL: (U)

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); BRAZIL (BR); UNITED KINGDOM (UK);
RUSSIA (RS); MAURITIUS (MP); CANADA (CA); JAPAN (JA).

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SECTION 1 OF 2

***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****

BODY

SUBJ: [REDACTED] ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN INTEREST IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 1999 ELECTION (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET - NOFORN~~.

/-----/ DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

/-----/ DOI: (U) 990412.

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

TEXT: 1. ~~(CONF)~~ INTRODUCTION. THE FOREIGN INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICA'S 1999 ELECTION FOCUSES FIRST ON THE SITUATION IN THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTION AND ON ELECTION DAY. SECOND, IT FOCUSES ON THE FOREIGN ROLE-PLAYERS' VIEW AND PERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD. THE MOST PROMINENT ISSUES ARE INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND A THABO ((MBEKI))-LED GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY.

2. (U) FOREIGN INTEREST IN PRE-ELECTION PERIOD.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4
(c);Sec. 1.4(d)

B. ~~(CONF)~~ THE ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) ALSO WANTS TO SEND ELECTION OBSERVERS TO MONITOR THE PROCESS. SENIOR OAU STAFF BELIEVE THAT THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF ELECTIONS IN 1999 IN TWO OF AFRICA'S MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES, SOUTH AFRICA AND NIGERIA, WILL BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR AN OTHERWISE RESTLESS AND UNSTABLE CONTINENT.

C. ~~(CONF)~~ BRAZILIAN SECRETARY-GENERAL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SEIXAS ((CORREIA)) RECENTLY INDICATED THAT BRAZIL DID NOT ANTICIPATE ANY PROBLEMS DURING OR AFTER THE ELECTION. HE ALSO ADDED THAT BRAZIL

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DOES NOT FORESEE ANY CHANGES IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA AFTER THE ELECTION.

D. ~~(C)(4)~~ ALTHOUGH FOREIGN ROLE-PLAYERS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL OBSERVERS HAVE NOT EXPRESSED ANY NOTEWORTHY CONCERN REGARDING

VIOLENCE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTION, THE SAME CAN NOT BE SAID OF THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA. A REUTERS OPINION POLL PUBLISHED ON 9 APRIL

1999, STATED THAT POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE IS LIKELY TO MAR THE ELECTION. THE POLL SHOWED THAT KWAZULU-NATAL, WESTERN CAPE AND EASTERN CAPE WERE THE PROVINCES MOST LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE.

E. ~~(C)(4)~~ NO INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED OF ANY FOREIGN SUPPORT TO ORGANIZATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS PLANNING TO DISRUPT THE ELECTION OR TO LAUNCH AN ANTI-ELECTION CAMPAIGN.


3. ~~(C)(4)~~ FOREIGN INTEREST IN THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD: VIEWS ON MBEKI'S ABILITY TO TAKE OVER THE REINS OF POWER AFTER PRESIDENT NELSON ((MANDELA))'S RETIREMENT RANGES FROM THOSE EXPRESSING POSITIVE VIEWS TO OTHERS HAVING SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE SECURITY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION AFTER THE ELECTION.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c); Sec. 1.4(d)

B. ~~(C)(4)~~ OTHER COUNTRIES WITH POSITIVE VIEWS, INCLUDE MAURITIUS AND RUSSIA. BOTH THE MAURITIUS GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION EXPECT BILATERAL RELATIONS TO STRENGTHEN UNDER MBEKI'S LEADERSHIP. THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY DOES NOT FORESEE ANY CHANGES IN RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA IN THE SHORT TERM. RUSSIA WOULD, HOWEVER, LIKE TO SEE INCREASED COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA ON ECONOMIC ISSUES AND WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE THAT IMPORTANT ISSUES SUCH AS THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRY ARE ADDRESSED.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c); Sec. 1.4(d)

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c);Sec. 1.4(d)



5. ~~(CNE)~~ CONCLUSION. CURRENT INFORMATION DOES NOT INDICATE ANY THREAT OR RISK OF A FOREIGN NATURE TO THE ELECTION. HOWEVER, THERE

ARE A FEW ISSUES OF CONCERN THAT WILL NEED CONSTANT MONITORING. THE

MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS THE SECURITY SITUATION IN LESOTHO. IF LARGE-SCALE UNREST AND RIOTING BREAK OUT AGAIN IN LESOTHO, IT

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COULD HAVE A VERY NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE SITUATION IN THE BORDERING PROVINCES OF THE FREE STATE AND THE EASTERN CAPE. ANY NEED FOR AN INCREASED DEPLOYMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS TO LESOTHO ON THE EVE OF THE ELECTION COULD HAVE A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCES' DEPLOYMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTION. ANOTHER CONCERN IS THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INCREASE IN REFUGEES FLEEING THE CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND ANGOLA AND ENTERING SOUTH AFRICA THROUGH THE POROUS NORTH CAPE PROVINCE BORDER. SUCH AN INFLUX COULD NEGATIVELY IMPACT ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE PROVINCE AND COULD PUT THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, WHO WILL HAVE TO PROCESS THE REFUGEES' DOCUMENTATION, UNDER INCREASING STRAIN AS IT IS ALREADY OVERBURDENED WITH THE PROCESSING OF BAR-CODED ID DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. DURING THE 1994 ELECTION, RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM AND THE SUPPORT IT RECEIVED FROM FOREIGN SOURCES WERE SEEN AS A REAL THREAT TO THE ELECTION. HOWEVER, NO INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED UP TO NOW INDICATING ANY FOREIGN SUPPORT TO RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST GROUPS OPPOSED TO THE ELECTION.

(b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;Sec. 1.4(c);Sec. 1.4(d)

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